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Abstract 
The present paper analyzes the presence of the axiom of the rationality of the political 
actors in theories of International Relations and traces considerations about the concept 
of rationality as a whole, its theoretical limits and the main criticisms about it. Aiming to 
overcome the absence of an in-depth conceptualization for the idea of rationality, the 
paper base itself on the literature of rational choice theory of Political Science to define 
the concept in question. It questions the validity of considering the states as rational 
actors and the limits of explanation offered by the axiom of rationality, addressing the 
criticisms originated from the constructivist current of International Relations. It 
concludes that considering states as rational actors is a valid theoretical simplification in 
cases where subnational actors with decision-making power behave as a cohesive unit 
and argues that rationalist theories and approaches such as constructivism are 
potentially reconcilable, considering that they are two analytical lenses whose nature is 
more complementary than contradictory. 
Keywords: Rationalism; Rational Choice; Models of Foreign Policy Analysis; Two-Level 
Games; Nested Games. 
 
Resumo 
O presente artigo analisa a presença do axioma da racionalidade dos atores políticos nas 
teorias das Relações Internacionais e traça considerações a respeito do conceito de 
racionalidade como um todo, seus limites teóricos e as principais críticas a seu respeito. 
Visando suprir a ausência de uma conceitualização aprofundada para a ideia de 
racionalidade, o artigo se ampara na literatura da teoria da escolha racional da Ciência 
Política para definir o conceito em questão. Questiona-se a validade de considerar os 
Estados como atores racionais e os limites de explanação oferecidos pelo axioma da 
racionalidade, abordando as críticas provenientes da corrente construtivista das 
Relações Internacionais. Conclui-se que considerar os Estados como atores racionais é 
uma simplificação teórica válida em casos nos quais os atores subnacionais com poder 
decisório se comportem como uma unidade coesa e argumenta-se que as teorias 
racionalistas e as abordagens como o construtivismo são potencialmente reconciliáveis, 
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tendo em vista que se tratam de duas lentes analíticas cuja natureza é mais 
complementar do que contraditória. 
Palavras-chave: Racionalismo; Escolha Racional; Modelos de Análise de Política 
Externa; Jogos de Dois Níveis; Jogos Ocultos. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The belief in the rationality of actors that operate in the international 
system is a central axiom in several of the major theories of International 
Relations, which can be perceived from the very first debate of the discipline 
between the idealists and the classic realists. However, as point out by Duncan 
Snidal, “rational choice is a methodology […] wide open in terms of specific 
substantive content” (2013, p. 86), and, in this sense, some basic theoretical 
aspects concerning the adoption of this axiom seem to have been curiously little 
explored by International Relations theorists: what is the definition used to 
determine the concept of rationality? What parameters must be met to consider 
a given actor as a rational agent? What are the limits imposed by the adoption of 
this axiom? 
Aiming to contribute to the debate in question, the present paper will seek 
to make considerations about the application of the axiom of rationality in 
international relations and the theoretical implications of doing so. Thus, the first 
part of the paper will be devoted to a brief review of the application of the axiom 
of rationality in International Relations theories. In order to overcome the lack of 
an in-depth conceptualization of rationality, it will be adopted the concept as 
described by the rational choice theory of Political Science, emphasizing the 
works of George Tsebelis (1990) and Anthony Downs (1957). 
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In the second part, the paper will explore the conceptual validity of 
treating states as rational entities and how to explain apparently irrational 
behaviors adopted by them. In this section will be presented two models of 
analysis to understand the state action in these cases of apparent irrationality, 
based on the concepts of “two-level game” by Robert Putnam (1988) and “nested 
games” by George Tsebelis (1990). Finally, the third and last section will present 
considerations about the explanatory limits of the axiom of rationality when 
applied to International Relations and how it can relate to theories that are not 
based directly on it, such as the constructivism as expressed by Alexander Wendt 
(1992). 
 
2. THE AXIOM OF RATIONALITY AND ITS RELATION TO THE MAIN THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 
 
The axiom of the rationality of political actors has been continuously 
present in the most diverse theories of International Relations since the 
emergence of it as Science, presenting itself with varying degrees of relevance 
from one theory to another. In the first pages of his classic work “Politics Among 
Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace”, Hans Morgenthau already points to 
the existence of two great traditions of political thought. The first of these 
traditions, now understood in the field of International Relations as classical 
idealism, “believes that a rational and moral political order, derived from 
universally valid abstract principles, can be achieved here and now” 
(MORGENTHAU, 1997, p. 3), thus relying on the rationality of the actors to 
perceive and seek a global political order that would guarantee a supposed 
common good. 
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Morgenthau identifies himself with a second tradition, which, in the 
author’s perspective, manifests a “theoretical concern with human nature as it 
actually is” (MORGENTHAU, 1997, p. 4), reason why it ended up being named 
realism. In direct confrontation with the main propositions of classical idealism, 
the author states: 
This being inherently a world of opposing interests and of 
conflict among them, moral principles can never be fully 
realized, but must at best be approximated through the ever 
temporary balancing of interests and the ever precarious 
settlement of conflicts (MORGENTHAU, 1997, p. 3). 
Although it represents an absolute negation of the idealistic logic that the 
simple rationalization of political processes by the actors could lead to the 
establishment of an order that would guarantee the common good, it is important 
to note that Morgenthau does not establish a direct denial to the rationality of the 
actors, defending rather that they do not act in pursuit of common good, but 
always seeking their own interests. It is, therefore, a critique of the purpose of the 
rational process advocated by the classical idealist current, not of the process 
itself. 
With the change of focus carried out by neorealism in relation to classical 
realism, leaving aside the importance given to human nature while assuming the 
anarchic nature of the international system as the main determinant of 
international politics, the axiom of the rationality of the actors assumes a new 
prominent role. While exposing the central premises on which neorealism is 
based1, Mearsheimer argues that “states think strategically about how to survive 
in the international system. States are instrumentally rational” (MEARSHEIMER, 
1994, p. 10). In summary, from the neorealist perspective, the nation-states – the 
                                                          
1 The premises of neorealism exposed by Mearsheimer (1994, p. 10) are: (1) the international system is anarchic; (2) 
all states have some offensive military capability; (3) the states are never certain about the intentions of other states; 
(4) the basic objective of all states is their own survival; and (5) states act in a rational way. 
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only actors considered relevant in the international relations – act in a rational 
and self-centered way in an environment defined by systemic anarchy, with their 
basic objective being to ensure their own survival. 
Drawing a parallel to contemporary debates in international security 
studies, Busan and Hansen argue that the validity (or invalidity) of the axiom of 
rationality applied to state actors results in major consequences for security 
theories, since 
 
‘international security’ is at the most general level about the threats 
states (or other political entities) face and the responses they can and 
should adopt to defend themselves, it makes a huge difference what 
kind of actors those states are. If states are rational, it is possible to 
predict their behaviour – and thus define appropriate security policies – 
to a much greater extent than if they are not (BUZAN; HANSEN, 2009, 
p. 30). 
 
However, the authors also emphasize the debate prompted by the very adoption of the 
concept of rationality and, above all, by the meaning of this concept: according to Buzan 
and Hansen, most of the criticisms about the axiom of state rationality in the field of 
international security studies float around the idea that “a rational state” is necessarily a 
state that is and acts according to realistic principles, which “are neither objective, nor 
analytically or politically neutral” (BUZAN; HANSEN, 2009, p. 31). That said, it must 
be considered that, although the axiom of the rationality of state actors is undeniably one 
of the basic assumptions associated with the neorealist theory, in the field of International 
Relations neorealism is far from being the only theoretical current that accepts this axiom 
as true. 
For example, in regards to the liberal institutionalist theory, Robert Keohane 
and Lisa Martin – in  a work that stands precisely as a direct response to Mearsheimer’s 
(1994) criticism of the institutionalist theory – categorically state that “liberal 
institutionalists treat states as rational egoists [...]. Like realism, institutionalist theory is 
utilitarian and rationalistic” (KEOHANE; MARTIN, 1995, p. 39), with the essential 
difference between the two theories residing “in contrasting understandings of why 
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institutions are created and how they exert their effects” (KEOHANE; MARTIN, 1995, 
p. 48). Thus, while authors associated with the neorealist theory argue that international 
institutions are relevant only as instruments of the major powers in the execution of its 
policies (MEARSHEIMER, 1995, p. 86), and that cooperation between states is 
inevitably constrained by the logic of relative gains (WALTZ, 1979, p. 105), 
institutionalist authors see institutions as responsible for promoting changes in the 
expectations of states in relation to each other’s actions, especially by providing 
information on the behavior of other state actors in the international system – which 
ultimately increases the capacity of them rationally make assertive choices. The central 
argument of liberal institutionalist theory, therefore, revolves around the idea that 
international institutions are created and maintained by rational states, which recognize 
its importance through a logical calculation. 
Beyond the theoretical boundaries of the classical debate between neorealist 
and liberal institutionalists, it is also possible to identify the acceptance of the axiom of 
the rationality of the state actors as a basilar element in other schools of International 
Relations. Hedley Bull, for example, by combining the grotian rationalist tradition with 
the realistic idea of systemic anarchy, recognizes the possibility of creating an 
international order essentially derived  
from fear of unrestricted violence, of the instability of 
agreements or of the insecurity of their independence or 
sovereignty. It may have its origins in rational calculation that 
the willingness of states to accept restrictions on their freedom of 
action is reciprocal. Or it may be based also on the treatment of 
these goals as valuable in themselves and not merely as a means 
to an end - it may express a sense of common values as well as of 
common interests (BULL, 2002, p. 64).  
The “anarchical society” advocated by Bull is thus supported by two 
possible processes of rationalization (or a combination of them): one focused on 
the personal objectives of the actors, and the other on the recognition of common 
interests, supported by the rules and agreements in force. 
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However, although the axiom of the rationality of actors is widely 
accepted by the theoretical currents of International Relations, notably its concept 
is not adequately explained in most of the texts cited above. Of these, the best 
conceptualization presented appears to be that done by Hedley Bull, who defines 
an actor who behaves rationally as one “that is acting in a way that is internally 
consistent and consistent with given goals” (BULL, 2002, p. 101). In addition, 
Buzan and Hansen point out that structural theories, such as neorealism, adopt 
a systemic perspective of the axiom of rationality, meaning that states will not 
always behave in a necessarily rational way, “but that those who do not will be 
punished by the structure, and will eventually either fall by the wayside or learn 
how to behave” (BUZAN; HANSEN, 2009, p. 31). Although they already present 
some central points to be considered, namely the need for coherence between 
strategy and objective and the achievement of sub-optimal results in cases of 
deviant behavior, the concept of rationality still sounds superficial and 
incomplete. Thus, aiming at a more appropriate theoretical understanding of the 
concept that is central to this article, this paper will turn to the works of the 
rational choice theory of Political Science to extract a more precise concept, 
applicable to International Relations2, for the idea of rationality. 
The theory of rational choice of Political Science has its fundamental base 
in the axiom of human rationality, understood in a similar way to the 
conceptualization presented by Bull, as “nothing more than an optimal 
correspondence between ends and means” (TSEBELIS, 1990, p. 18), that is, it 
argues that actors will always adopt a maximizing behavior in their social 
interactions. Its behavioral model is typically economic, understanding the 
purposes objectified through the concept of utility (DOWNS, 1957, p. 36). In this 
                                                          
2 The use of these concepts in the study of international relations is not new. Robert Gilpin (1981, p. xii), for example, 
openly admits the use of this approach in the preface of his book “War and Change in World Politics”. This paper differs 
itself by specifically using these works to explore the theoretical implications of accepting the axiom of rationality of 
political actors in the International Relations field. 
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regard, its central axiom may be reduced to the idea that individuals adopt 
behaviors that maximize utility – which, in the field of International Relations, 
can be translated as national security, if the realistic perspective is adopted for 
example. 
Therefore, it remains to know what the inherent characteristics of a 
rational behavior are. Tsebelis seems to be the author who presents the most 
advanced categorization, theorizing the existence of two sets of requirements to 
consider a given behavior as rational: the weak requirements, set that “assures the 
internal coherence of preferences and beliefs”; and the strong requirements, which 
“introduce requirements for external validity (the correspondence of beliefs with 
reality)” (TSEBELIS, 1990, p. 24). Thus, the set of the weak requirements 
(TSEBELIS, 1990, p. 24–27) of rationality is: 
(1) The impossibility of contradictory beliefs or preferences;  
(2) The impossibility of intransitive preferences, meaning that the 
preferences must present a logical hierarchy between them; 
(3) And conformity to the axioms of probability calculus, which means 
that an actor will be willing to take risks if he considers that the 
probability of winning multiplied by the prize is equal or outweighs 
the chances of losing multiplied by the fee. 
On the other hand, the strong requirements (TSEBELIS, 1990, p. 28–31) are:  
(1) Adoption of strategies that are mutually optimal in equilibrium, from 
which the actors have no incentive to deviate; 
(2) Probabilities that approximate objective frequencies;  
(3) Beliefs that approximate reality. 
Therefore, an actor can objectively be considered rational if the strategies 
that he adopts are in accordance with the objectives he draws, being necessary 
that this rationality manifests itself in two dimensions: the first, of the weak 
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requirements, is associated with the relationship between the strategy and the 
objective and regards the internal cognitive aspects of the actor in question – that 
is, the simple ability to find answers to a problem –, while the second dimension, 
of the strong requirements, is linked to their concreteness in practical terms. 
Having defined the parameters in which rational action occurs, this paper now 
proceeds to what may be his most controversial issue: are states rational entities? 
 
3. ARE THE STATES RATIONAL ACTORS? 
 
Before addressing the central question of this paper, it is necessary to 
consider an even more basic issue: What are states? Considering the definition 
proposed by Weber, a state “is a human community that (successfully) claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” 
(WEBER, 1991, p. 78). Adopting a similar conception, Morgenthau argues that 
The sovereignty of the nation […] manifest itself in what is called 
the “impenetrability” of the nation. This is another way of saying 
that on a given territory only one nation can have sovereignty – 
supreme authority – and that no other state has the right to 
perform governmental acts on its territory without its consent 
(MORGENTHAU, 1997, p. 330). 
He further states that “without the mutual respect for the territorial 
jurisdiction of the individual nation, [...] international law and a state system 
based on it could obviously not exist” (MORGENTHAU, 1997, p. 330). Thus, it 
will be adopted the perspective that, individually, the state is an organized 
human community that successfully claims the legitimate use of force within a 
given territory, while the community of states consists in the mutual recognition 
by these human communities of their sovereignties over their respective 
territories. 
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Being states nothing more than political organizations controlled by 
individuals, logically they cannot possess a rationality of their own, since they 
are incapable of executing cognitive processes by themselves. Any inferred 
rationality must, therefore, necessarily be derived from the individuals who 
control them and from the institutional pressures to which they are potentially 
subject. In fact, the theory of rational choice itself is emphatic in the logical refusal 
to methodological collectivism, arguing that social phenomena are only possible 
to be understood if they are liable to be reduced to individual behavior 
(TSEBELIS, 1990, p. 20–21). Therefore, the concept of the rationality of states 
actors in the international relations has its theoretical origin derived from the 
presumption that these human communities behave at the international level in 
a consistent and unitary way or, as described by Allison (1969, p. 698), “centrally 
controlled, completely informed, and value maximizing”. 
As demonstrated in the previous section, the presumption of a rationality 
behavior derived from national unity at the international level is present in the 
views expressed by various theoretical currents of International Relations. For 
example, the neorealism, as expressed by Mearsheimer (1994, p. 10), is based on 
some premises about the international system and the behavior of states, being 
among them the rational nature and the quest for survival as the basic objective 
of any state. Thus, neorealism considers that states – understood as organized 
political communities –  behave at the international level in a consistent and 
unitary way (either because subnational actors are united around a supposed 
“national interest”; because only a limited group has access to the means of 
international action; or for any other reason that can be theorized), being the 
perpetuation of their state the ultimate goal of all actors. 
In order to maintain the focus proposed by this paper on the question of 
state rationality, let us consider the second preposition to be true, despite the 
existing debate around it. Therefore, it will be adopted as truth the idea that the 
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basic objective of all states is undoubtedly their survival. So why do states 
sometimes behave in a seemingly irrational way? How to explain situations in 
which states willingly and constantly submit to situations that tend to reduce 
their security in the medium and long term (such as ceding control of resources 
of great importance to the war industry, such as oil and iron, to foreign 
companies)? In summary, assuming as true the realistic argument that the 
international system is managed by the logic of security, how to explain 
behaviors that diverge from the main objective of survival? 
The answer to these questions lies in the very nature of states as organized 
political communities, which necessarily implies the recognition of the existence 
of political dynamics internal to these same communities. Robert Putnam 
outlines some valuable considerations in this regard, noting that “central 
decision-makers (“the state”) must be concerned simultaneously with domestic 
and international pressures” (PUTNAM, 1988, p. 431). Thus, the author argues 
that a nation's foreign policy can often be interpreted as a “two-level game”, 
according to which: 
At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by 
pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and 
politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those 
groups. At the international level, national governments seek to 
maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while 
minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. 
Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision-
makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet 
sovereign (PUTNAM, 1988, p. 434). 
 In a similar way, George Tsebelis goes even further by arguing that the 
apparent irrationality behind certain actions of an actor considered to be rational 
may be the result from an inadequate frame of reference used by the analyst. In 
his words: 
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if, with adequate information, an actor’s choices appear to be 
suboptimal, it is because the observer’s perspective is 
incomplete. The observer focuses attention on only one game, 
but the actor is involved in a whole network of games – what I 
call nested games (TSEBELIS, 1990, p. 7). 
In these terms, a seemingly irrational foreign policy can be interpreted as 
a result of subnational actors with decision-making power (the ones responsible 
for defining the actions of the state internationally) seeking to maximize their 
gains in other arenas or dynamics, whose data are not always available to the 
analyst – the so-called “nested games”.  
 
4. THE THEORETICAL LIMITS OF THE AXIOM OF RATIONALITY 
 
As demonstrated at the beginning of this paper, the axiom of rationality 
has been widely accepted by the main currents of International Relations since 
the emergence of it as science and, as Wendt (1992, p. 391) points out, historically 
“the debate between “neorealists” and “neoliberals” has been based on a shared 
commitment to “rationalism””. Nonetheless, the definition of the concept of 
rationality and the required characteristics of rational behavior are topics to 
which International Relations theorists seem to devote little attention. In this 
sense, the adoption of studies from rational choice theorists of Political Science 
contributes to delimiting precisely what is meant by “rational behavior”, 
providing greater precision to the resulting analyzes while adopting a more 
comprehensive behavioral model. 
However, the in-depth adoption of rational choice theory also opens room 
for the criticisms to which the theory is subject. Green and Shapiro (1994), for 
example, point to a number of problematic issues in the rational choice approach, 
such as the abstraction of factors of influence on political behavior, the logical 
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inversion in the derivation of hypotheses and problems (with the problems being 
selected to prove the hypothesis) and the lack of capacity for empirical 
confirmation of the rationality of the actors. Even in the field of International 
Relations it is possible to find criticism of this approach, with Wendt correctly 
pointing out that the analysis based on the rational choice approach disregard 
questions of identity and interest on the part of the actors, which are fundamental 
to the understanding of their objectives (WENDT, 1992, p. 392). In this sense, 
authors like Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner (1998) and Price and Reus-Smit 
(1998) have suggested that the debate between rationalism versus constructivism 
may become one of the central topics in the field of International Relations. 
That said, it is important to point out that the own authors associated with 
rational choice theory recognized that the specific utility that one given actor 
seeks to maximize (that is, the individual goals of that actor) are, indeed, treated 
as secondary by the theory. The theories that are focused specifically on the 
axiom of rationality are not concerned with the objectives aimed by the actors, 
considering the reason for their preferences as not relevant. Rational behavior 
refers to the means that are employed, that is, the behaviors that the actors adopt 
in order to achieve their ends (DOWNS, 1957, p. 5). In practical terms, the axiom 
of rationality has the theoretical potential to explain the means employed by 
actors to achieve their goals but is unable to elucidate the goals behind these acts. 
In the rationalist theories of the International Relations, this gap is often filled by 
the adoption of a second axiom, defending that the basic objective of any state is 
its survival in the international anarchic environment.  
Ultimately, the logic of survival of the nation-state as its central and 
ultimate goal makes sense. Since the state apparatus is the source of power of the 
subnational actors acting through it, they are expected to wish to ensure its 
continuity. Therefore, assuming the states as rational entities is an acceptable 
theoretical simplification in certain areas, but it should be borne in mind that it is 
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just that: a simplification. Notwithstanding, in cases where simplification is not 
feasible given the apparent irrationality of states, the applicability of the rational 
axiom in International Relations gains a new strength if we consider domestic 
actors as holders of the real rationality – that is, a rationality of themselves, as 
opposed to the merely theoretical rationality of the nation-states, which in turn 
derives from these sub-national actors – and the multiplicity of arenas in which 
they are involved. 
Although it directly criticize the rationalist approach, theories like 
constructivism as expressed by Wendt (1992), which proposes the creation of a 
specific theory about the formation of identities and interests, are still potentially 
reconcilable with the axiom of rationality. This is even recognized by the author 
himself, who argues that “there are also substantial areas of agreement [between 
constructivism and rationalism], and where genuine differences exist they are as 
often complementarities as contradictions” (FEARON; WENDT, 2002, p. 52). In 
this sense, Wendt and Fearon stress the role of ideas as central in the rational 
process, stating that  
rationalist explanations are a species of intentional explanation, 
the basic structure of which is the formula, ‘Desire + Belief = 
Action’. This means that at their core – the level of individual 
choice – ideas are an essential, not just secondary, element of 
rationalist explanation (FEARON; WENDT, 2002, p. 59) 
Thus, considering that the focus of theories like constructivism is on 
understanding the attribution of meanings responsible for shaping the actors’ 
perspectives, their final objectives and the institutional environment in which 
they operate – factors that are precisely the elements that base the actors rational 
thought – rationalism seems far from being really overcome in the field of 
International Relations. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
As has been shown throughout the paper, the axiom of rationality of 
political actors is a theoretical basis shared by some of the major theories of 
International Relations. However, the shallow conceptualization of it tends to 
generate superficial and sometimes confusing theoretical considerations. Thus, 
the adoption of the concept of rationality as exposed by rational choice theorists 
of Political Science, of which this paper emphasized George Tsebelis and 
Anthony Downs, provides more refined conceptual tools for the researcher in the 
field of International Relations. 
In addition, the adoption of the concept of states as organized political 
communities with the monopoly of the use of force in their territories guarantees 
in theoretical terms the possibility of the researcher to open the “black-box” to 
search for elements in domestic politics that help explain the international 
positioning of the state in question, without abandoning the axiom of rationality. 
In this sense, concepts such as Tsebelis’ “nested games” or Putnam’s “two-level 
games” offer functional models of analysis to be explored. However, this does 
not necessarily imply the inability to treat states as rational entities for analytical 
purposes. Such theoretical simplifications are valid in situations where 
subnational actors with decision-making capacity act in a consistent and 
reasonably unitary way at the international level. The research problem must 
always be responsible for determining the most appropriate method of analysis, 
never the other way around. 
Nevertheless, the adoption of the studies of theorists associated with the 
rational choice approach also causes the criticisms they suffer to be taken into 
account. Of those, the most significant is undoubtedly the inability of the axiom 
of rationality, or of the models based on it, to explain the formation of the goals 
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that drive the actors’ actions. However, recognizing this gap and understanding 
the explanatory limits of the axiom of rationality makes its application feasible 
along with theories that seek precisely to understand how the identities and goals 
that drive the actors are formed. This makes it possible to even imagine, within 
the limits of rationalism, a potential overcoming of power politics by changing 
the sets of meanings that the actors attribute to each other and to the other 
elements of the international system, as theorized by Wendt (1992), since it is 
from these sets of meanings that the actors rationalize the world. However, this 
is an unlikely prospect of being undertaken in the short and medium term, since 
the actors who are in privileged positions in the current model lack incentives to 
change their way of acting and thinking. Therefore, doing so would be irrational. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
ALLISON, G. T. Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The 
American Political Science Review, v. 63, n. 3, p. 689–718, 1969.  
BULL, H. The Anarchical Society - A Study of Order in World Politics. 3. ed. 
New York: Palgrave, 2002.  
BUZAN, B.; HANSEN, L. The Evolution of International Security Studies. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.  
DOWNS, A. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row, 
1957.  
FEARON, J. D.; WENDT, A. Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View. 
In: CARLSNAES, W.; RISSE, T.; SIMMONS, B. A. (Eds.). . Handbook of 
International Relations. 1. ed. Londres: SAGE Publications, 2002. p. 52–72.  
GILPIN, R. G. War and Change in World PoliticsCambridge UK Cambridge 
University Press History, 1981.  
GREEN, D. P.; SHAPIRO, I. Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A 
Critique of Applications in Political Science. New Haven: Yale University 
  131 InterAção 
 
Revista InterAção, v. 9, n. 1, jan/jun 2018                                                                ISSN 2357-7975 
 
Press, 1994.  
KATZENSTEIN, P. J.; KEOHANE, R. O.; KRASNER, S. D. International 
Organization and the Study of World Politics. International Organization, v. 
52, n. 4, p. 645–685, 1998.  
KEOHANE, R. O.; MARTIN, L. L. The Promise of Institutionalist Theory. 
International Security, v. 20, n. 1, p. 39–51, 1995.  
MEARSHEIMER, J. J. The False Promise of International Institutions. 
International Security, v. 19, n. 3, p. 5–49, 1994.  
MEARSHEIMER, J. J. A Realist Reply. International Security, v. 20, n. 1, p. 82–
93, 1995.  
MORGENTHAU, H. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle For Power And 
Peace. 6. ed. Beijing: Peking University Press, 1997.  
PRICE, R.; REUS-SMIT, C. Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory 
and Constructivism. European Journal of International Relations, v. 4, n. 3, p. 
249–294, 1998.  
PUTNAM, R. D. Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. 
International Organization, v. 42, n. 03, p. 427–460, 1988.  
SNIDAL, D. Rational Choice and International Relations. In: CARLSNAES, W.; 
RISSE, T.; SIMMONS, B. A. (Eds.). . Handbook of International Relations. 2. 
ed. Londres: SAGE Publications, 2013. p. 85–111.  
TSEBELIS, G. Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.  
WALTZ, K. N. Theory of International Politics. Reading: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, Inc., 1979.  
WEBER, M. Politics as a Vocation. In: Essays in Sociology. [s.l.] Psychology 
Press, 1991.  
WENDT, A. Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of 
Power Politics. International Organization, v. 46, n. 2, p. 391–425, 1992.  
